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Abstract—In [3] the authors proposed a new aggregate signature scheme referred to as multiple-TA (trusted authority) one-time
identity-based aggregate signature (MTA-OTIBAS). Further, they gave a concrete MTA-OTIBAS scheme. We recall here the definition
of MTA-OTIBAS and the concrete proposed scheme. Then we prove that our MTA-OTIBAS concrete scheme is existentially
unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model under the co-CDH problem assumption.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In [3] we proposed a new aggregate signature scheme
referred to as multiple-TA (trusted authority) one-time
identity-based aggregate signature (MTA-OTIBAS). Further,
we gave a concrete MTA-OTIBAS scheme. We first recall the
notion of MTA-OTIBAS; we then recall its formal definition
and the concrete scheme proposed in [3]. Then, we give the
detailed security proof of MTA-OTIBAS (not given in [3]).
An MTA-OTIBAS scheme has the following features.
Firstly, each user’s public key is his identity, so no certificate
is needed on the public key, which avoids the certificate
management overhead. Secondly, a signer’s private key
(corresponding to an identity and a lower-level TA) is re-
stricted to be used only once; after that, the signer’s private
key should be updated. Thirdly, the MTA-OTIBAS scheme
also allows signature aggregation and fast verification, i.e.,
n signatures can be aggregated into a single short signature
(even signatures generated by signers enrolled by different
lower-level TAs), which greatly saves storage space, and can
be verified simultaneously.
We recall the formal definition of MTA-OTIBAS in Sec-
tion 2. In Section 3 we recall the concrete MTA-OTIBAS
scheme. Then in Section 4 we prove that our MTA-OTIBAS
concrete scheme is existentially unforgeable against adap-
tively chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model
under the co-CDH problem assumption.
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2 DEFINITION OF MTA-OTIBAS
An MTA-OTIBAS scheme consists of six algorithms, i.e.,
Root.Setup, LowLevel.Setup, Extract, Sign, Aggregate, and
Verify. Root.Setup is run by the root TA to generate
the global system parameters and system master key.
LowLevel.Setup is an interactive protocol run between a
lower-level TA and the root TA. It generates the secret key,
public key and certificate of the lower-level TA. Extract
takes as input a lower-level TA’s secret key and a signer’s
identity, and outputs a private key for the signer. Sign takes
as input a signer’s identity, his private key, the certificate of
the signer’s corresponding lower-level TA and any message,
and outputs a signature on the message. The signature is
only valid under the signer’s identity and the certificate of
his corresponding lower-level TA. A restriction here is that
a private key corresponding to a specific identity issued
by a lower-level TA can be used only once. However, the
same identity can be enrolled by different lower-level TAs.
This implies that the corruption of a lower-level TA does
not influence the signers enrolled by other lower-level TAs.
Aggregate is used to aggregate n message-signature pairs
generated by the Sign procedure into a single signature, i.e.,
an aggregate signature. Verify is used to check the validity
of an aggregate signature. It takes as input n messages, the
corresponding aggregate signature, n identities enrolled by
l lower-level TAs, and outputs 1 or 0 to represent whether
the aggregate signature is valid or not.
3 A CONCRETE MTA-OTIBAS SCHEME
Our MTA-OTIBAS scheme is realized using bilinear maps
which are widely employed in identity-based cryptosys-
tems. A map eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT is called a bilinear map
if eˆ(g1, g2) 6= 1 and eˆ(g
α
1 , g
β
2 ) = eˆ(g1, g2)
αβ for all α, β ∈ Z∗q ,
where G1,G2 are two cyclic groups of prime order q, GT
is a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order, g1 is a
generator of G1, and g2 is a generator of G2. By exploiting
bilinear maps, we implement our MTA-OTIBAS scheme.
Root.Setup: The root TA runs this algorithm to generate
2the system parameters as follows:
1) Choose q,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, eˆ, ψ, where ψ is a com-
putable isomorphism from G2 to G1, with ψ(g2) =
g1 [2].
2) Pick κ ∈ Z∗q as its master secret key, and compute
y = gκ2 as its master public key.
3) Select cryptographic hash functions H0(·) : {0, 1}
∗
→ G1 and H1(·) : {0, 1}
∗ → Z∗q .
4) Publish the system global parameter Ψ =
(eˆ, q,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, H0(·), H1(·), ψ).
LowerLevel.Setup: In an MTA-OTIBAS scheme, before a
lower-level TA can recruit members, it must be enrolled by
the root TA. The root TA may add the public information of
a lower-level TA (e.g., identity and public key) to the system
global parameters. Let the identity of a lower-level TA Ti be
IDTi . Ti picks κi ∈ Z
∗
q as its secret key and computes yi =
gκi2 as its public key. (IDTi , yi) are submitted to the root
TA. On input (IDTi , yi), the root TA generates a certificate
certTi which is signed using its master secret key. Finally,
certTi is sent to Ti.
Extract: Suppose a signer with identity IDj wants to join
the system maintained by Ti whose secret key is κi. On
input the signer’s identity IDj , Ti generates the private key
for the signer as follows:
1) Compute idj,0 = H0(IDj , 0), idj,1 = H0(IDj , 1);
2) Compute sj,i,0 = id
κi
j,0, sj,i,1 = id
κi
j,1, and set sj,i =
(sj,i,0, sj,i,1) as the private key of the signer.
Sign: To sign a message mk, a signer with identity
IDj enrolled by Ti and private key sj,i = (sj,i,0, sj,i,1)
computes hk = H1(mk, IDj, certTi), σk = sj,i,0s
hk
j,i,1. The
signer outputs σk as the signature on mk.
Aggregate: This publicly computable algorithm
aggregates n signatures into a single signature. Let an entity
collect n message-signature pairs {(m1, σ1), · · · , (mn, σn)}
signed by n users with corresponding identities
{ID1, · · · , IDn} enrolled by l lower-level TAs
{T1, · · · , Tl}. For simplicity, we assume {ID1, ..., IDt1},
{IDt1+1, ..., IDt2}, ..., {IDtl−1+1, ..., IDtl} are enrolled
by T1, · · · , Tl respectively. The message-signature pairs
are divided into l sets corresponding to the l lower-level
TAs. This algorithm outputs Ω as the resulting aggregate
signature, where Ω =
∏n
i=1 σi.
Verify: To verify an aggregate signature Ω on mes-
sages {m1, ..., mn} under I1 = {ID1, ..., IDt1}, I2 =
{IDt1+1, ..., IDt2}, ..., Il = {IDtl−1+1, ..., IDn} enrolled by
T1, · · · , Tl respectively, the verifier performs the following
steps:
1) For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, compute hj = H1(mj , IDj, certTi)
and idj,0 = H0(IDj , 0), idj,1 = H0(IDj , 1).
2) Define I′1 = {1, ..., t1}, I
′
2 = {t1 +
1, ..., t2}, ..., I
′
l = {tl−1 + 1, ..., n}. Check
eˆ(Ω, g2)
?
=
∏l
i=1 eˆ(
∏
j∈I′i
idj,0id
hj
j,1, yi). Output
1 if the equation holds; else output 0.
4 SECURITY PROOF
An MTA-OTIBAS scheme should be secure. Informally, an
MTA-OTIBAS scheme is said to be secure if no polynomial-
time attacker not requesting a private key of an entity en-
rolled by a lower-level TA can forge an aggregate signature
that is valid (i.e., such that Verify outputs 1) corresponding
to that entity enrolled by the lower-level TA.
In general, the security of an MTA-OTIBAS scheme is
modeled via the following EUF-CMA (existential universal
forgery under adaptive chosen-message attack) game [1]
and takes place between a challenger CH and an adversary
A. The game has the following three stages:
Initialize: CH runs the Root.Setup algorithm to obtain a
master secret key and the system parameters. CH then sends
the system parameters to A while keeping secret the master
secret key.
Attack: A can perform a polynomially bounded number of
the following types of queries in an adaptive manner.
• LowerLevel.Setup queries: A may ask CH to set up a
lower-level TA. On input an identity IDTi of a lower-
level TA, CH generates the secret key and certificate
of the lower-level TA.
• Corrupt.LowerLevel queries: A can request the secret
key of a lower-level TA Ti. On input IDTi , CH
outputs the corresponding secret key of Ti.
• Extract queries: A can request the private key of an
entity with identity IDj issued by a lower-level TA
Ti. On input (IDj , certTi), CH outputs the corre-
sponding private key of the entity.
• Sign queries: A can request an entity’s signa-
ture on a message mk. On receiving a query on
(mk, IDj, certTi), CH generates a valid signature σj
on mk under (IDj , certTi), and replies with σj .
Forgery: A outputs l′ sets of identities I∗1 = {ID
∗
1 , ..., ID
∗
t1},
I
∗
2 = {ID
∗
t1+1, ..., ID
∗
t2}, ..., I
∗
l′ = {ID
∗
tl′−1+1
, ..., ID∗n} en-
rolled by l′ lower-level TAs with certificates from the set
{cert∗T1 , ..., cert
∗
Tl′
}, a set of n messages {m∗1, ...,m
∗
n} and
an aggregate signature σ∗. For simplicity, we assume m∗i
corresponds to ID∗i for i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Awins the above game, if all of the following conditions are
satisfied:
1) σ∗ is a valid aggregate signature on messages
{m∗1, ...,m
∗
n} under I
∗
1 = {ID
∗
1 , ..., ID
∗
t1}, I
∗
2 =
{ID∗t1+1, ..., ID
∗
t2}, ..., I
∗
l′ = {ID
∗
tl′−1+1
, ..., ID∗n}
and {cert∗T1 , ..., cert
∗
Tl′
}.
2) At least, one private key of an entity issued by
a lower-level TA is not queried by A during the
Extract queries and the lower-level TA is not cor-
rupted. Without loss of generality, we assume the
identity of the entity is ID∗1 and its corresponding
lower-level TA is T1
∗ with certificate cert∗T1 .
3) For a message m 6= m∗1, the query (m, ID
∗
1 , cert
∗
T1
)
can be queried at most once, and (m∗1, ID
∗
1 , cert
∗
T1
)
is never queried during the Sign queries.
We can now define the security of an MTA-OTIBAS
scheme in terms of the above game.
3Definition 1. An MTA-OTIBAS scheme is secure, i.e., se-
cure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-
message attack, iff the success probability of any polyno-
mially bounded adversary in the above EUF-CMA game
is negligible.
We next recall the co-CDH assumption on which the
security of the signature scheme in Section 3 rests.
Definition 2 (co-CDH Assumption). The co-CDH assump-
tion in two cyclic groups G1 and G2 of prime order q
equipped with bilinearity states that, given (ga1 , g
b
2) for
randomly chosen a, b ∈ Z∗q , it is hard for any polynomial-
time algorithm to compute gab1 .
Regarding the security of our MTA-OTIBAS scheme, we
have the following claim.
Theorem 1. Assume an adversary A has an advantage
ǫ in forging an MTA-OTIBAS scheme of Section 3 in
an attack modeled by the above EUF-OTIBAS-CMA
game, within a time span τˆ ; the adversary can make
at most qHi times Hi(·) (i = 0, 1) queries, qL times
LowerLevel.Setup queries, qC times Corrupt.LowerLevel
queries, qE times Extract queries, qS times Sign queries.
Then the challenger can solve the co-CDH problem
with probability ǫ′ ≥ 4e2(qC+qE+qS+n+2)2 ǫ within time
τˆ ′ = τˆ +O(4qH0 + qL+ qS)τG1 , where τG1 is the time to
compute a point exponentiation in G1 and n is the size
of the aggregating set.
Proof: Let CH be a co-CDH attacker who receives a co-
CDH challenge instance (ga1 , g
b
2) and wants to compute the
value of gab1 . A is an adversary who interacts with CH as
modeled in the EUF-CMA game. We show how C can useA
to break the co-CDH assumption.
Initialize: Firstly, CH selects Ψ = (eˆ, q, G1, G2, GT , g1, g2,
y, H0(·), H1(·), ψ), where y = g
κ
2 , and κ is the master secret
key; then Ψ is sent to A.
Attack: We consider the hash functions H0(·) and H1(·)
as random oracles. A can perform the following types of
queries in an adaptive manner.
H0(·) queries: CH maintains a list H
list
0 of tuples
(IDi, αi,0, α
′
i,0, αi,1, α
′
i,1, idi,0, idi,1, coini). This list is ini-
tially empty. Whenever CH receives anH1 query on (IDi, j)
(where j = 0 or 1), CH does the following:
• If IDi exists in a previous query, find (IDi, αi,0, α
′
i,0,
αi,1, α
′
i,1, idi,0, idi,1, coini) on H
list
1 and return idi,j .
• Else, first flip a coin coini ∈ {0, 1} that yields 1 with
probability δ and 0 with probability 1− δ. Then do:
– If coini = 0, select αi,0, αi,1 ∈ Z
∗
q , com-
pute idi,0 = g
αi,0
1 , idi,1 = g
αi,1
1 , set α
′
i,0 =
α′i,1 = 0, return idi,j and add (IDi, αi,0,
α′i,0, αi,1, α
′
i,1, idi,0, idi,1, coini) to H
list
0 .
– Else randomly select
αi,0, α
′
i,0, αi,1, α
′
i,1 ∈ Z
∗
q , set idi,0 =
g
αi,0
1 g
a
1
α′i,0 , idi,1 = g
αi,1
1 g
a
1
α′i,1 , and add
(IDi, αi,0, α
′
i,0, αi,1, α
′
i,1, idi,0, idi,1, coini) to
H list0 . Return idi,j as the answer.
LowerLevel.Setup queries: CH maintains a list TAlist of tu-
ples (IDTi , κi, yi, certTi , coinTi). On input an identity IDTi
of a lower-level TA, CH does the following:
• If there is a tuple (IDTi , κi, yi, certTi , coinTi) on
TAlist, return certTi as the answer.
• Else, choose κi ∈ Z
∗
q , flip a coin coinTi ∈ {0, 1} that
yields 1 with probability δ and 0 with probability
1− δ and do the following:
– If coinTi = 0, set κi as the secret key,
compute yi = g
κi
2 , generate a certifi-
cate certTi corresponding to (IDTi , yi), add
(IDTi , κi, yi, certTi , coinTi) to TA
list.
– Else, compute yi = g
bκi
2 , generate a certifi-
cate certTi corresponding to (IDTi , yi), add
(IDTi , κi, yi, certTi , coinTi) to TA
list.
In the rest of this paper, we assume that if a certificate
coinTi appears, A has already made a corresponding Low-
erLevel.Setup query.
H1(·) queries: CH keeps a list H
list
1 of tuples
(IDi,mi, certTi , hi, coin
′
i). This list is initially empty.
Whenever A issues a query H1(IDi,mi, certTi), CH does
the following:
• If there is a tuple (IDi,mi, certTi , hi, coin
′
i) onH
list
1 ,
return hi as the answer.
• Else, submit (IDi, 0) to H0 and recover the tu-
ple (IDi, αi,0, α
′
i,0, αi,1, α
′
i,1, idi,0, idi,1, coini) from
H list0 , recover the tuple (IDTi , κi, yi, certTi , coinTi)
from TAlist, flip a coin coin′i ∈ {0, 1} that yields 1
with probability δ and 0 with probability 1− δ. Then
do the following:
– If coinTi = coini = 1 and coin
′
i = 1, add
(IDi,mi, certTi , hi, coin
′
i) to H
list
1 and return
hi = −α
′
i,0/α
′
i,1 as the answer.
– Else, randomly select hi ∈ Z
∗
q , add
(IDi,mi, certTi , hi, coin
′
i) to H
list
1 and return
hi as the answer.
Corrupt.LowerLevel queries: On input an identity IDTi of a
lower-level TA, CH first makes a LowerLevel.Setup query
on IDTi , and recovers the tuple (IDTi , κi, yi, certTi , coinTi)
on TAlist. If coinTi = 0, CH returns κi as the answer;
otherwise, C aborts.
Extract queries: When A issues an Extract query on
(IDi, certTi), the same answer will be given if the re-
quest has been asked before. Otherwise, CH recovers
(IDTi , κi, yi, certTi , coinTi) from TA
list; C checks whether
(IDi, αi,0, α
′
i,0, αi,1, α
′
i,1, idi,0, idi,1, coini) is on H
list
0 ; if it
is not, CH submits (IDi, j) to H0(·) to generate such a
tuple, where j = 0 or 1. Finally, if coini = coinTi = 1,
CH aborts; else if coinTi = 0, it returns (id
κi
i,0, id
κi
i,1); else it
returns (ψ(g
bκiαi,0
2 ), ψ(g
bκiαi,1
2 )).
Sign queries: On receiving a Sign query on
(IDi,mi, certTi), CH first queries H0(IDi, j) (j = 0
or 1), LowerLevel.Setup(IDTi) and H1(IDi,mi, certTi)
if they were not queried before, then recovers
(IDi, αi,0, α
′
i,0, αi,1, α
′
i,1, idi,0, idi,1, coini) from
H list0 , (IDTi , κi, yi, certTi , coinTi) from TA
list and
(IDi,mi, coinTi , hi, coin
′
i) fromH
list
1 . Finally CH generates
the signature as follows:
• If coini = coinTi = coin
′
i = 1, compute and output
σi = ψ(g
bκi(αi,0−αi,1α
′
i,0/α
′
i,1)
2 ).
4• Else if coini = coinTi = 1, coin
′
i = 0, abort.
• Else, use the Sign algorithm to generate the signa-
ture, since the corresponding private key is known
to CH.
Note that, as defined in our security assumptions, an
adversary can only get one signature corresponding to the
target identity and lower-level TA. Hence, CH aborts if
coini = coinTi = 1, coin
′
i = 0.
Forgery: Eventually, A outputs l′ sets of identities
I
∗
1 = {ID
∗
1, ..., ID
∗
t1}, I
∗
2 = {ID
∗
t1+1, ..., ID
∗
t2}, ..., I
∗
l′ =
{ID∗tl′−1+1, ..., ID
∗
n} enrolled by l
′ lower-level TAs with
certificates from the set {cert∗T1 , ..., cert
∗
Tl′
}, a set of n mes-
sages {m∗1, ...,m
∗
n} and an aggregate signature Ω
∗. Once A
finishes queries and returns its forgery, CH proceeds with
the following steps.
For all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, j ∈ {1, ..., l′}, CH finds (ID∗i ,
α∗i,0, α
′∗
i,0, α
∗
i,1, α
′∗
i,1, id
∗
i,0, id
∗
i,1, coin
∗
i ) on H
list
0 and
(ID∗Tj , κ
∗
j , y
∗
j , cert
∗
Tj
, coin∗Tj) on TA
list. For all ID∗i ∈ I
∗
j ,
CH also recovers the tuples (ID∗i ,m
∗
i , cert
∗
Tj
, h∗i , coin
′∗
i )
from H list1 , where ID
∗
i is enrolled by Tj . It is required
that there exists ID∗i ∈ I
∗
j such that coin
∗
i = coin
∗
Tj
= 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume i = j = 1. Be-
sides, it is required that for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, coin∗i = 0.
In addition, the forged aggregate signature must satisfy
eˆ(Ω∗, g2) =
∏l′
j=1 eˆ(
∏
i∈I′
j
id∗i,0id
∗
i,1
h∗i , y∗j ), where id
∗
i,0 =
H0(ID
∗
i , 0), id
∗
i,1 = H0(ID
∗
i , 1), h
∗
i = H1(ID
∗
i ,m
∗
i , coin
∗
Tj
),
I
′
1 = {1, ..., t1}, I
′
2 = {t1+1, ..., t2}, ..., I
′
l = {tl′−1+1, ..., n}.
Otherwise, CH aborts.
Since the forged aggregate signature must satisfy
eˆ(Ω∗, g2) =
∏l′
j=1 eˆ(
∏
i∈I′
j
id∗i,0id
∗
i,1
h∗i , y∗j ), and id1,0 =
g
α1,0
1 g
a
1
α′1,0 , id1,1 = g
α1,1
1 g
a
1
α′1,1 , for all i ∈ {2, ..., n}, id∗i,0 =
g
α∗i,0
1 , id
∗
i,1 = g
α∗i,1
1 , we have
gab1 = (Ω
∗(
l′∏
j=2
∏
i∈I′
j
ψ(y∗j )
−
∑
i∈I′
j
(α∗i,0+h
∗
iα
∗
i,1))×
ψ(y∗1
−
∑t1
i=1(α
∗
i,0+h
∗
iα
∗
i,1)))
1
κ∗
1
(α′∗
1,0
+h∗
1
α′∗
1,1
) .
To complete the proof, we shall show that CH solves the
given instance of the co-CDH problem with probability at
least ǫ′. First, we analyze the three events needed for C to
succeed:
• Σ1: CH does not abort as a result of any of A’s
Corrupt.LowerLevel, Extract and Sign queries.
• Σ2: A generates a valid and nontrivial aggregate
signature forgery.
• Σ3: Σ2 occurs, coin∗1 = coinT1 = 1, coin
′∗
1 = 0 and
for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, coin∗i = 0.
CH succeeds if all of these events happen. The probabil-
ity Pr[Σ1 ∧ Σ2 ∧ Σ3] can be decomposed as Pr[Σ1 ∧ Σ2 ∧
Σ3] = Pr[Σ1] Pr[Σ2|Σ1] Pr[Σ3|Σ1 ∧ Σ2].
Claim 1. The probability that CH does not abort as a result of
A’s Corrupt.LowerLevel, Extract and Sign queries is at least
(1− δ)qC+qE+qS . Hence we have Pr[Σ1] ≥ (1− δ)qC+qE+qS .
Proof: For a Corrupt.LowerLevel query, CH will abort iff
coinTi = 1. It is easy to see that the probability that CH
does not abort is 1 − δ. Since A can make at most qC times
Corrupt.LowerLevel queries, the probability that CH does
not abort as a result of A’s Corrupt.LowerLevel queries is at
least (1− δ)qC .
For an Extract query, CH will abort iff coini = coinTi =
1. It is easy to see that the probability that CH does not
abort for an Extract query is 1 − δ2 > 1 − δ. Since A can
make at most qE times Extract queries, the probability that
CH does not abort as a result of A’s Extract queries is at
least (1− δ)qE .
When CH receives a Sign query, he will abort iff coini =
coinTi = 1, coin
′
i = 0 happen. So for a Sign query, the
probability that CH does not abort is 1− δ2(1 − δ) > 1− δ.
SinceAmakes at most qS times Sign queries, the probability
that CH does not abort as a result of A’s Sign queries is at
least (1− δ)qS .
Overall, we have Pr[Σ1] > (1 − δ)qC+qE+qS .
Claim 2. Pr[Σ2|Σ1] ≥ ǫ.
Proof: If CH does not abort, then A’s view is identical to
its view in the real attack. Hence, Pr[Σ2|Σ1] ≥ ǫ.
Claim 3. The probability that CH does not abort after A
outputting a valid and nontrivial forgery is at least δ(1−δ)n.
Hence Pr[Σ3|Σ1 ∧Σ2] ≥ δ(1− δ)n.
Proof: Events Σ1 and Σ2 have occurred, and
A has generated a valid and nontrivial forgery
(ID∗1 , ..., ID
∗
n;m
∗
1, ...,m
∗
n,Ω
∗). CH will abort unless A gen-
erates a forgery such that there exists an i ∈ {1, ..., n} such
that coin∗1 = coin
∗
T1
= 1, coin′∗1 = 0, and for 2 ≤ i ≤ n,
coin∗i = 0. Therefore, Pr[Σ3|Σ1 ∧ Σ2] ≥ δ
2(1 − δ)n.
In total, we have ǫ′ = Pr[Σ1 ∧ Σ2 ∧ Σ3] > (1 −
δ)qC+qE+qSδ2(1 − δ)nǫ ≥ 4e2(qC+qE+qS+n+2)2 ǫ, where e is
Euler’s constant.
5 CONCLUSION
We have proven that our MTA-OTIBAS concrete scheme is
existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message
attacks in the random oracle model under the co-CDH
problem assumption.
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